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MUNICIPAL LABOR PERSPECTIVES ON
THE PUBLIC SECTOR WELFARE
WORKFORCE IN NEW YORK CITY
MARY J. O'CONNELL*
District Council 37 ("DC 37") is the major municipal union in
New York City (the "City"). It represents approximately 120,000
municipal employees.1 The majority of non-uniformed, non-
pedagogical City workers are DC 37 members. This includes a
wide range of people, from attorneys to zoologists. DC 37 also
represents professional employees and several entry-level work-
ers, who have entered the labor force for the first time and are
first generation workers.
The first issue is that of organizing the welfare workforce.
Initially it seemed that workfare workers or Work Experience
Program ("WEP") participants could not organize, because they
are not "employees."2 Currently, workfare participants do not
have the rights to organize and bargain collectively, but they may
later. The New York City Office of Collective Bargaining has set
some precedent in this area, but not much.
There are, however, a couple of decisions concerning the
rights of workfare participants to organize and bargain collec-
tively. In 1981, DC 37 filed a petition concerning those who were
then called Public Work Project workers. 3 The Board, in that
case, found that these workers were ineligible to organize and
bargain collectively because they were not employees under the
*Senior Assistant Counsel, DC 37 AFL-CIO; B.A., J.D., State University of New York
at Buffalo.
I See Steven Greenhouse, Giuliani and Union Postpone Layoffs at City Hospi-
tals, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al; see also Steven Greenhouse, After Scandals,
New Union Leaders Turn More Aggressive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1999, at B1.
2 See New York City Collective Bargaining Law, N.Y. CITY ADMIN CODE § 12-
305 (N.Y. Legal Publ'g Corp. Supp. 1998) ("Public employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join or assist public employee organizations, to bargain
collectively through certified employee organizations of their own choosing and shall
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.").
3 See District Council 37, No. RU-760-80 (Bd. of Certification, N.Y. City Office of
Collective Bargaining June 30, 1981).
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New York City Collective Bargaining Law.4 This conclusion was
based on the fact that their work was not volitional.5 In other
words, there was not the traditional employer-employee relation-
ship required by the Act, because the employees were not work-
ing of their own accord. The Board analogized the organizing
rights of workfare workers to that of prisoners in a case decided
by the State Public Employment Relations Board.6 The present
state of the law has its foundation in this decision.
That case is distinguishable from an earlier one that was de-
cided in 1974 concerning workers who were part of a separate
employment project called the Work Relief Employment Project. 7
In the earlier case, welfare grants were diverted from the social
services side of the budget and sent directly to agencies to pro-
vide paid employment opportunities for workfare recipients.8
This literally created a job program. There were over 9,000
workers in that program,9 and they were able to organize and
bargain collectively.10 This distinguishing precedent is currently
on the books.
Some unions have attempted to get workfare workers into
the bargaining unit by filing grievances under recognition
clauses in the collective bargaining agreement. Such attempts do
not seem to have been successful anywhere.
At any rate, workfare workers presently do not have the le-
gal status to organize and bargain collectively. The discussions
that the 1996 legislation has engendered and the initiatives by
all types of labor groups do recognize that these program mem-
bers are working. This might make a difference in future deci-
sions.
The relevant inquiry is not what you are called, and not
whether you are a workfare participant, but whether you work.
4 See id., slip op. at 21.
5 See id. at 17-18.
6 See id. at 16-17 (discussing Prisoners' Labor Union, 5 N.Y. Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd.
5-4040 (Dir. Pub. Pr. 1972), affd, 6 N.Y. Pub. Emp. Rel. Bd. 6-3033 (1973), aff'd
sub nom., Prisoners' Labor Union v. Helsby, 354 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1974)).
7 See District Council 37, No. RU-465-74 (Bd. of Certification, N.Y. City Office of
Collective Bargaining May 7, 1975) (holding that the statute implementing the Work
Relief Employment Program was constitutional because its participants did not ac-
quire civil service status).
8 See id., slip op. at 3-4.
9 See id. at 17.
10 See id. at 22.
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Workfare workers have issues that lend themselves to collective
bargaining. They are different issues, perhaps, than what have
traditionally been considered, but the collective bargaining proc-
ess is flexible enough to accommodate them.
The second important workfare issue concerns displacement.
In this state-unlike other areas of the country-there are court
decisions that concern displacement."' The old social services
law, which was repealed when Governor Pataki signed the state
reform act, provided for worker protections and contained anti-
displacement language stating that workfare workers could not
be used to displace regular employees or to perform work that
was "ordinarily and actually" performed by them.' 2 The courts
interpreted that language to mean that an employer would have
to have the intention of replacing a regular employee with a
workfare participant in order to violate the statute. The stan-
dard was very difficult to overcome. Even in a layoff situation,
some of the cases brought by DC 37 years ago demonstrated that
as long as there was not an intent to replace, a public employer
could utilize a workfare participant to perform the work that had
traditionally been performed by regular employees.
When New York State passed the Welfare Reform Act, it did
not reach as far as it should have to protect the regular employ-
ees who might be affected by the influx of workfare workers. The
one bright spot, however, seemed to be the anti-displacement
language. That language is contained in section 336-c of the cur-
" See, e.g., Danker v. Department of Health, 194, N.E. 857, 859 (N.Y. 1935) (de-
claring that it is impermissible under section 16 of the Economy Act, ch. 178, 1934
N.Y. Laws 647, 654, to abolish civil service employees' positions for the pretextual
purpose of substituting emergency relief workers); AFSCME New York Council v.
City of Lackawanna, 476 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that a layoff in-
volving at least 26 employees whose work is now being performed by workfare work-
ers is sufficient to raise triable issues of fact regarding whether the city assigned
workfare workers to perform the work "ordinarily and actually" performed by civil
employees); Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (Sup. Ct.) (determining
that, at a minimum, section 164(2)(b) of the Social Service Law, N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 164(2)(b) (McKinney 1992) (repealed 1997), prohibited the dismissal of "civil
service employee[s] ... to make room for.., relief recipients"), affd sub noma. Got-
baum v. Lindsy, 350 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (App. Div. 1973).
1 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 164(2)(b) (McKinney 1992) (prohibiting workfare
participants from "perform[ing] any work ordinarily and actually performed by...
regular employees"), repealed by Welfare Reform Act of 1997, ch. 436, pt. B, § 147-a,
1997 N.Y. Laws 1080, 1208.
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rent state law 3 and is far broader than the language of the fed-
eral statute. 14 It expands the laundry list of displacement actions
that are prohibited to include not only layoffs but also infringe-
ment of promotional opportunities. 15
In this state workfare workers are not allowed to do work or-
dinarily and actually performed by regular employees. There can
be no partial displacement and no loss of bargaining unit posi-
tions on their account. This displacement language is much bet-
ter. It is, however, relatively new. It has only been around since
August 1997 and will be more meaningful when it has been com-
prehensively applied.
Utilizing workfare participants in City jobs has caused a de-
cline in the City workforce in recent years, especially during the
present administration. 16 What DC 37 has done directly con-
fronts this problem.
In April of 1998, there was a planned layoff for DC 37 mem-
bers in Local 420, the hospital workers' local.17 These workers
hold titles such as dietary aide, housekeeping aide, and institu-
tional aide. Their jobs do not have major high-tech skill re-
quirements, or educational requirements, but these workers are
the front line workers at public hospitals. They clean the hospi-
tals, assist in the care of the patients, help serve the food, and
work in the cafeteria. They do not do glamorous work in the hos-
pitals, but their work is absolutely necessary if there is to be a
13 See Welfare Reform Act of 1997, N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 336-c(2)(e)(i)-(v)
(McKinney 1998) (prohibiting a workfare participant from getting an assignment
that would in any affect the rights of any currently employed worker).
14 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
607(f)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
15 See Welfare Reform Act of 1997 § 336-c(2)(e)(ii) (prohibiting "the employ-
ment.., of a participant... when any other person is on layoff from the same or
any equivalent position"); id. § 336-c(2)(e)(iii) (prohibiting "any infringement of the
promotional opportunities of any current employed person").
16 See Steven Greenhouse, Many Participants in Workfare Take the Place of City
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at Al ("ITihe 34,100 people in the city's Work
Experience Program constitute a low-cost labor force that does a substantial amount
of the work that had been done by municipal employees before Mayor Rudolph W.
Giuiani reduced the city payroll by about 20,000 employees, or about 10 percent.");
see also David Rohde, City Hospital Workers Sue Over Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1998, at B2 (reporting that District Council 37 "filed a lawsuit in State Supreme
Court... accusing the city of laying off union members at city-run hospitals and il-
legally replacing them with workfare participants").
17 See Ian Fisher, 600 Laid Off in Hospitals as Deal Fails, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1998, at 1; Dan Janison, Workfare Railed as Slavery, NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 1998, at
A8.
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viable public hospital system. There were 649 of these workers
scheduled for layoff on Friday, May 1, 1998.18 At the same time,
approximately 900 WEP participants were working in the public
hospitals, a number of which had layoffs.19
DC 37 filed an order to show cause, which alleged violations
of the new anti-displacement language in the social services law.
DC 37 argued that not only was there a layoff situation, but peo-
ple would be losing their jobs to workfare participants. The city
could not utilize workfare participants to do work that should be
performed by regular employees in a layoff situation. DC 37 also
claimed a loss of bargaining unit positions, because the number
of regular jobs has decreased substantially in the past few years.
On April 23, 1998, the City announced that every workfare
participant had been removed from the public hospitals and
claimed the case was moot. This may be recognition by the City
that it cannot cavalierly use the workforce in this manner. The
City simply cannot have workfare participants working in a loca-
tion where people are going to be laid off.
The question is what is going to happen next? Because of
the way the workfare program has been exploited in the City, the
hospital workers' problem is a situation that could easily be re-
peated. Perhaps when the layoffs are forgotten, workfare par-
ticipants will be put in. This issue is not moot in a legal sense.
This is the first time this law has been so directly chal-
lenged. The last thing the City probably wants is a decision on
the merits of the case, which is probably why they took the pre-
ventive action they did.
There are a couple of other issues DC 37 is concerned about
as a union of organized labor. One of them is the issue of the pri-
vatization of eligibility checking. DC 37 represents a title called
"eligibility specialist." These are the people that work in the wel-
18 See Frank Lombardi, After City Hosp Deal Erodes, Lay-Offs for 600, DAILY
NEWS (New York), May 17, 1998, at 6 (reporting that more than 600 hospital work-
ers were scheduled to be laid off the following day because of the inability of Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani and labor officials to reach a compromise).
19 See Michael Finnegan, Union Sues vs. Hosp-Aide Lay-Offs, DAILY NEWS (New
York), Apr. 18, 1998, at 3 ("The city has assigned about 850 Work Experience Pro-
gram participants to clean, prepare food and perform other tasks... previously...
done by civil servants."); see also Ian Fisher, Court Allows Hospital Layoffs, But
Doesn't Settle Workfare Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1998, at B7 (reporting District
Council 37's allegations that the city planned to replace 905 laid off hospital workers
with workfare workers).
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fare centers and determine the eligibility of individuals for bene-
fits, for food stamps, and for Medicaid. DC 37 has a substantial
number of members who perform that function.
Prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,20 federal law had provided that any-
one who worked in this area and made the eligibility determina-
tion had to be selected based on a merit system.21 That merit
system had always been interpreted to be the civil service sys-
tem. Thus, civil service employees would perform the eligibility
determinations. The Welfare Reform Act revoked that require-
ment, and the question became who can do the eligibility deter-
mination?
There was great concern in the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees and other national un-
ions whose members performed this function that private com-
panies would be very interested in getting into the market for
performing eligibility determinations. Companies have stated
they are interested in assuming this function for the government.
Certain jurisdictions, most notably Texas, have attempted to pri-
vatize all of their benefit eligibility determinations. It wanted to
have a private company determine whether someone is only eli-
gible for benefits or also for food stamps and Medicaid. Texas
applied for a waiver to allow it to contract out all eligibility de-
terminations for all federal benefits. The federal government
rejected that waiver, which is good news. It makes sense that if
a public employer cannot contract out all of its eligibility deter-
minations, it is not going to necessarily want to contract out some
of them.
In New York State and New York City, legislation passed on
both the state and local level concerning the privatization of
functions like eligibility determination. In the social services
law, there are specific provisions concerning privatization of eli-
gibility determinations. 22 Also under Local Law 35, a New York
City law, the City is required to engage in an administrative pro-
cess prior to contracting out work that may have displaced city
20 Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(5) (1994) (amended 1996).
22 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 20-c (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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workers. 23 This law is another method by which privatization
can be opposed.
DC 37 is also concerned about workplace violence. It has not
received sufficient attention. It is usually not until something
tragic happens that people focus on this issue. There is concern,
as the welfare system changes and people either lose benefits or
are taken off cash assistance and put on voucher assistance, that
there may be an increase in violent incidents in the workplace.
DC 37 wants to enable its workers to address more effectively the
issues that will arise as a result of the integration of a welfare
workforce.
Finally, job supply is an important issue. Work is certainly a
noble and positive thing, but unfortunately there is severe un-
employment in the City.24 DC 37 submitted affidavits to the
courts in the Hospital Workers case discussed above to demon-
strate that fact. The affidavits were from people that had been
on welfare for a number of years or months and who were finally
able to get a job at a city hospital that had benefits and paid a
decent wage. Now they were being given pink slips. They felt
that they had kept their end of the bargain in getting a job and
were then being laid off.
In all of this, the basic problem is that there can be all the
workfare in the world, but if there are not enough decent jobs,
there simply is not much else to do. Those are the union's issues,
in a nutshell. They are also your issues, and the issues of every-
one in the nation concerned about social justice.
23 See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 312 (N.Y. Legal Publ'g Corp. 1990 & Supp. 1998)
(outlining City's procurement procedure), amended by N.Y. CITY LOCAL LAW No. 35
§ 1 (1994) (stating that "[slound procurement practice requires an assessment by the
agency of the costs and benefits of providing a service in-house prior to any determi-
nation to solicit bids or proposals").
2 See Sylvia Nasar, January Gain in Jobs Doubled the Forecast, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1999, at C1 (reporting that the unemployment rate in New York City is one
of the highest among large cities in the United States).
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